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		ABSTRACT	 By	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1960s	 Tunisia	 had	 developed	 a	 very	 aggressive	 tourism	 policy	
designed	 to	encourage	 foreign	private	 investment	 in	 the	 sector.	 In	 fact	 tourism	became	one	of	
the	 flagships	 of	 Tunisian	 development,	 strongly	 contributing	 to	 re-invent	 the	 international	
reputation	of	Tunisia	as	an	open,	‘democratic	and	liberal’	country.	Even	if	the	political	scenario	
has	changed	after	the	‘Jasmine	revolution’,	continuity	seems	to	prevail	in	the	tourism	sector.	This	
paper	focuses	on	this	continuity,	examining	two	specific	dimensions:	the	persistence	of	Tunisia’s	
tourist	model	 and	 the	 continuity	 in	 the	 representation	 of	 Tunisian	 tourism	as	 the	 pillar	 of	 an	
everlasting	process	of	change.	
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Introduction	Since	the	1970s,	the	tourist	industry	has	been	one	of	the	flagships	of	Tunisian	developmental	efforts.	 Crucial	 to	 overall	 economic	 growth	 strategy,	 it	 also	 served	 the	 purpose	 of	strengthening	Tunisia’s	 reputation	 as	 an	 open	 country,	 attuned	 to	 the	 values	 of	modernity.	However,	 despite	 the	 resilience	of	 the	narrative	of	grandeur2	Ben	Ali	 deployed	 to	 celebrate	economic	progress	linked	to	tourism,	the	sector	is	in	crisis.3	Indeed,	the	decrease	in	tourism	
																																								 																				1	Department	of	Culture,	Politics	and	Society,	University	of	Turin.	Email:	rosita.diperi@unito.it		2	Tsourapas	advances	the	notion	of	‘primisme’	to	exemplify	the	narrative	of	grandeur	Ben	Ali	deployed	to	picture	Tunisia	 as	 the	 first	 country	 (‘premier’	 in	 French)	 in	 the	 region	 to	 reach	 economic	 and	 developmental	 goals.	Gerasimos	Tsourapas,	 ‘The	Other	Side	of	a	Neoliberal	Miracle:	Economic	Reform	and	Political	De-Liberalization	in	Ben	Ali's	Tunisia,’	Mediterranean	Politics	18,	1	(2013):	23-41.	3	 Isabelle	 Mandraud,	 ‘On	 Tunisia's	 tourist	 coast,	 frustration	 lurks	 behind	 the	 tranquil	 vistas,’	 The	 Guardian	
Weekly,	24/6/2014	http://goo.gl/eHpBLZ	(accessed	29/9/2014).	See	also	the	 interview	with	Habib	Bouslama,	
revenues	 after	 regime	 change	 and	 political	 turmoil	 between	 2010	 and	 20144	 has	 negative	consequences	 on	 the	 national	 economy	 as	 a	 whole.5	 Since	 2011,	 Tunisia	 has	 been	 going	through	 significant	 change,	 but	 a	 closer	 examination	 of	 the	 tourist	 industry	 suggests	 that	dynamics	of	continuity	prevail	over	change	despite	 the	sector’s	need	 for	reform.	This	article	examines	such	continuity	by	considering	two	thawabit	(constant,	in	Arabic).	First,	the	article	focuses	on	the	persistence	of	Tunisia’s	 tourist	model,	a	successful	combination	of	 ‘Sun,	Sand	and	Sea.’	This	is	particularly	interesting	considering	the	fact	that,	over	the	years,	the	resistance	of	this	sector	to	change	has	gone	hand	in	hand	with	the	resilience	of	political	power.	Second,	this	article	elaborates	on	the	continuity	in	the	representation	of	Tunisian	tourism	as	the	pivot	of	 a	 continuing	 process	 of	 change,	 which	 has	 been	 ideally	 going	 on	 since	 late	 1980s.	 Such	change,	 the	 article	 contends,	 is	 however	 a	 rhetorical	 instrument	 as	 the	 tourist	 industry	has	largely	 remained	 untouched	 over	 the	 years,	 although	 shrinking	 economic	 benefits	 for	investors	 and	 persisting	 territorial	 problems	 suggest	 that	 new	 strategies	 should	 be	implemented.	 These	 two	 dimensions	 are	 intertwined	 and	 reinforce	 each	 other.	 The	persistence	of	the	same	touristic	model	suggests	that	policy-makers	are	unable	or	unwilling	to	come	 up	 with	 new	 strategies,	 despite	 their	 rhetorical	 commitment	 to	 reform.	 As	 a	consequence,	such	continuity	strengthen	the	model,	which	also	 is	 increasingly	 isolated	 from	changes	 because	 it	 upholds	 abroad	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 stable	 and	 safe	 Tunisia,	 able	 to	 cope	with	political	crises	and	adapt	to	economic	reforms6	-	another	element	of	continuity	with	Ben	Ali’s	era.	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																								
The	 all-inclusive	 concept	 gave	 the	 'coup	 de	 grâce'	 to	 the	 Tunisian	 Hotel	 sector,	 Tourmag,	 3/3/2014	(http://goo.gl/A7H1iX,	accessed	21/07/2014).			4	 ‘Menaces	 sur	 la	 reprise	 du	 tourisme	 en	 Tunisie,’	 Maghreb	 Emergent,	 19/7/2014	 (http://goo.gl/G8AUXm,	accessed	31/08/2014).	5	 For	 a	 critical	 and	 exhaustive	 examination	 of	 the	 connection	 between	 political	 instability	 and	 tourism,	 see	Christian	 Steiner,	 ‘An	 overestimated	 relationship?	 Violent	 political	 unrest	 and	 tourism	 Foreign	 Direct	Investments	in	the	Middle	East,’	International	Journal	of	Tourism	Research	12,	6	(2010):	726-738.	6	The	World	Bank	considers	tourism	a	key	sector	in	Tunisia’s	development	and	has	suggested	over	the	years	a	number	 of	 reforms	 (coastal	 zone	 management	 plans,	 cultural	 heritage	 preservation).	 World	 Bank,	 Country	
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The	article	concludes	by	observing	that	although	the	crisis	of	the	touristic	sector	has	been	hidden	over	the	years	because	the	narrative	of	success	had	to	prevail,	political	instability	has	highlighted	 the	 contradictions	 within	 the	 sector,	 stimulating	 a	 more	 open	 debate	 on	development,	democracy	and	economic	growth.		
	
Methodology		The	case	of	Tunisian	tourism	is	relevant	to	this	special	issue	for	three	reasons.	First	is	the	deep	penetration	 of	 interests	 in	 the	 tourist	 sector	 within	 the	 Tunisian	 ruling	 elite.	 Second,	 the	Tunisian	 case	 shows	 how	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 fragmented	 system	 of	 governance,	characterised	by	autonomous	powerful	institutions,	created	in	different	periods	and	with	few	institutional	 linkages,	 has	 allowed	 them,	 at	 least	 since	 the	 late	 1980s,	 to	 act	 for	 the	maximization	of	 interests	 for	the	categories	that	they	represented	and	not	 for	the	benefit	of	the	sector	as	a	whole.	Third	is	the	negative	impact	that	the	chaotic	development	of	the	sector	has	had	not	only	on	the	territory,	but	in	addressing	authoritarianism	and	a	particular	model	of	development.	This	 article	 relies	 on	 fieldwork	 and	 semi-structured	 interviews	 carried	 out	 in	 Tunisia	between	2013	and	2014.	 In	 total	32	 in-depth	 interviews	have	been	conducted,	and	some	of	them	 have	 been	 repeated.	 The	 research	 has	 been	 realised	 in	 two	 phases.	 First,	 in	 order	 to	reconstruct	the	historical	memory	of	the	tourist	sector	(how	it	has	developed	over	the	years,	to	what	mechanisms	it	has	responded,	which	logics	prevailed…),	former	operators,	managers	and	ministries	of	tourism	have	been	interviewed.	During	the	second	phase,	the	attention	was	focused	 on	 the	 post-revolutionary	 period	 with	 the	 goal	 of	 grasping	 the	 ongoing	 dynamics	within	the	industry.	Therefore	former	civil	servants,	tourist	operators	such	as	hotel	managers,	travel	agents,	 trainers,	and	the	managers	of	 the	current	governing	bodies	of	 the	sector	have	been	 interviewed.	 In	 addition,	 participant	 observation	 was	 carried	 out	 during	 specific	
initiatives7	 to	 track	 down	 the	 evolving	 top-down	 relationship	 between	 national	 bodies	 and	local	actors.	
	
Tourism	and	politics	in	Tunisia		Tourism	 is	 considered	 a	 key	 sector	 in	 the	world	 economy.	 According	 to	 the	United	Nations	World	 Tourism	 Organization	 (UNWTO),	 in	 the	 last	 ten	 years,	 the	 turnover	 connected	 to	international	 tourism	 has	 increased	 exponentially	 and	 reached,	 in	 2012,	 $1,075	 billion	(against	 $1,042	 billion	 in	 2011	 and	 $575	 billion	 in	 2000).	 Similarly,	 the	 number	 of	 people	travelling	for	tourism	has	constantly	increased	exceeding	1	billion	in	2012,	with	1,035	million	tourists	crossing	borders	against	995	million	in	2011.8	Tourism	represents	5per	cent	of	global	GNP	 and	 significantly	 contributes	 to	 the	 global	 labour	 market	 as	 almost	 7per	 cent	 of	 jobs	worldwide	 are	 tourism-related.9	 However,	 such	 an	 increase	 in	 tourism-related	 activities	creates	 problems	 in	 terms	 of	 territorial	management,	 exploitation	 of	 natural	 resources	 and	poor	employment	conditions	 for	 the	 local	 labour	 force.	These	critical	 reflections	resonate	 in	the	 case	 of	 developing	 countries	 in	 particular.	 Documents	 released	 by	 international	organisations	 dealing	 with	 tourism,	 such	 as	 the	 UNWTO	 and	 the	 World	 Bank,	 show	 that	tourism-related	policies	have	become	more	and	more	normative	and	prescriptive,	de	facto	one	of	the	instruments	advancing	the	neo-liberal	economic	order.10		Because	of	its	economic	relevance,	tourism	is	a	highly	sensitive	political	issue	too.	Medium	and	 long-term	 effects	 of	 tourism-related	 policies	 strongly	 impact	 local	 and	 national	development,	affecting	the	elites	as	well	as	ordinary	citizens.	Thus	control	over	the	sector,	the	policies	 elaborated	 for	 its	 development	 and	 the	 social	 and	 cultural	 dynamics	 it	 originates	
																																								 																				7	The	days	of	the	‘Café	du	Patrimoine,’	Heritage	Day	celebrations	in	Kef	and	other	initiatives	in	the	Kef	region.	8	UNWTO,	Tourism	Highlights.	2013	Edition	(http://goo.gl/FQ0sYg,	accessed	24/03/2014).	9	Estimated	from	available	data.	Though	tourism	is	often	referred	to	as	the	largest	sector	in	the	global	economy,	its	exact	size	is	impossible	to	determine	as	it	has	no	clear	delimitation.	10	 Donald	 Hawkins	 and	 Shaun	 Mann,	 ‘The	 World	 Bank’s	 Role	 in	 Tourism	 Development,’	 Annals	 of	 Tourism	
Research	34,	2	(2007):	348-363.	
appeals	 to	 a	number	of	 state	 and	non-state	 actors,	which	 take	part	 in	 complex	negotiations	related	to	the	governance	of	tourism.	However,	despite	its	politically	charged	nature,	tourism	has	 appealed	 to	 scholars	 mainly	 for	 its	 economic	 and	 financial	 aspects.	 Consequently,	 the	scholarship	has	traditionally	neglected	the	political	dimension	of	tourism	and	the	role	of	the	state	in	it.11	Studies	have	linked	tourism	and	development,	focusing	in	particular	on	the	role	of	multinational	 companies	 and	 Foreign	 Direct	 Investments	 (FDIs)	 in	 sustaining	 growth	 and	stimulating	 development.	 Only	 few	 scholars	 and	 experts	 have	 paid	 attention	 to	 the	 link	between	 tourism	 and	 the	 social,	 political	 and	 economic	 conditions	 of	 the	 countries	 under	consideration.12	In	other	words,	while	much	attention	has	been	paid	to	tourism	as	an	engine	of	development,	 more	 recent	 studies	 question	 the	 very	 notion	 of	 development,	 also	 touching	upon	the	role	tourism	plays	 in	 it.	The	questions	these	studies	ask	relate	to	the	meaning	and	the	 politics	 of	 development,	 its	 models	 and	 objectives,	 and	 the	 way	 tourism	 merges	 with	political	 and	 economic	 elites’	 interests.13	 Following	 on	 from	 this,	 scholars	 have	 analysed	 a	number	of	connections	existing	between	tourism	and	political	phenomena.	Consequently,	different	approaches	emerged.	Some	scholars	rely	on	the	positivist	view	that	tourism	 is	 a	 sort	 of	 ‘magic	 formula’	 to	 bring	 about	 and	 promote	 virtuous	 processes	 of	democratisation	and	development.	Elaborating	on	modernisation	theory,	this	view	considers	that	tourism	is	not	only	a	tool	to	promote	development,	but	also	an	instrument	to	accelerate	economic	 and	 political	 processes	 stimulating	 transitions	 to	 democracy.14	 Other	 scholars	
																																								 																				11	As	also	Waleed	Hazbun	pointed	out:	‘Globalisation,	Reterritorialisation	and	the	Political	Economy	of	Tourism	development	in	the	Middle	East,’	Geopolitics	9,	2	(2004):	310-341.	12	See:	Raoul	Bianchi,	‘Towards	a	New	Political	Economy	of	Global	Tourism’,	in	Richard	Sharpley	and	David	Telfer	(eds.),	Tourism	and	Development.	Concepts	and	 Issues	 (Cleverdon:	Channel	View):	271;	Colin	Hall,	Tourism	and	
Politics:	Power,	Policy	and	Place	(London:	Chichester,	1994)	and	Thomas	Richter	and	Christian	Steiner,	‘Politics,	Economics	and	Tourism	Development	in	Egypt:	insights	into	the	sectorial	transformations	of	a	neo-patrimonial	rentier	state,’	Third	World	Quarterly	29,	5	(2008):	939-959.	13	 Frances	 Brown	 and	 Derek	 Hall,	 ‘Tourism	 and	 Development	 in	 the	 Global	 South:	 the	 issues,’	 Third	 World	
Quarterly	29,	5	(2008):	839-849.	14	 Telfer,	 ‘The	 Evolution	 of	 Tourism	 and	 Development	 Theory,’	 in	 Sharpley	 and	 Telfer	 (eds.),	 Tourism	 and	
Development,	cit.,	35-79.	
expose	 the	 problematic	 nature	 of	 such	 claims	 by	 elaborating	 on	 Goldworthy’s15	 critique	 of	development	 theories	 and	 by	 highlighting	 that	 the	 theoretical	 link	 between	 tourism	 and	development	simply	may	not	be	consistent	with	 the	 reality	on	 the	ground.16	Scholars	of	 the	Middle	 East	 have	 contributed	 to	 the	 debate	 by	 examining	 the	 connection	 between	authoritarian	 resilience	 and	 tourism,	 noting	 that	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 sector	 after	privatisation	 and	 neo-liberal	 reforms	 during	 the	 1990s	 has	 strengthened	 authoritarianism,	with	 the	ruler’s	circles	benefitting	 from	economic	reforms.	 In	 the	case	of	Egypt,	Richter	and	Steiner	highlighted	how	revenues	originating	 from	 tourism	were	not	 shared	with	 the	wider	public	 but	 distributed	 among	 the	members	 of	 closed	 ‘networks	 of	 privilege.’	 17	 This	 finding	also	speaks	to	the	scholarship	examining	the	causes	of	the	Arab	Uprisings,	as	the	outburst	of	popular	 discontent	 is	 strongly	 linked	 to	 the	 missing	 redistribution	 of	 wealth	 and	 the	‘predatory’	attitude	of	elites	in	the	region.18	The	 development	 of	 the	 tourist	 sector	 in	 Tunisia	 has	 followed	 a	 similar	 trajectory.	 In	particular,	 during	 the	 Ben	 Ali’s	 era,	 the	 predatory	 attitude	 of	 the	 elites	 and	 the	 president’s	closest	 circles,	 exacerbated	by	 liberalisation	policies,	was	paradoxically	 accompanied	by	 the	strengthening	 of	 the	 regime	 domestically	 and	 internationally.19	 Indeed,	 pre-2011	 Tunisian	regime	deployed	a	representation	of	Tunisia	as	a	successful	country	gradually	moving	towards	democratisation.	Tourism,	represented	as	a	‘developmental	miracle,’	became	one	of	the	pivots	of	 such	 a	 representation,20	 as	 demonstrated,	 for	 example,	 by	 the	 high	 incidence	 of	 Tunisia	tourism	contribution	on	GDP	 from	1990	 to	2013	 compared	 to	other	 larger	 countries	 in	 the	
																																								 																				15	David	Goldsworthy,	‘Thinking	politically	about	development,’	Development	and	Change	19,	3	(1988):	505–30.	16	Jennifer	Briedenhann	and	Eugenia	Wickens,	 ‘Tourism	routes	as	a	tool	for	the	economic	development	of	rural	areas.	Vibrant	hope	or	impossible	dream?,’	Tourism	Management	25,	1	(2004):	71–79.	17	Richter	and	Steiner,	‘Politics,	Economics	and	Tourism	Development	in	Egypt,’	cit.		18	Gilbert	Achcar,	The	people	want.	A	radical	exploration	of	the	Arab	uprisings	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	 2013);	 Angela	 Joya,	 ‘The	 Egyptian	 revolution:	 crisis	 of	 neoliberalism	 and	 the	 potential	 for	 democratic	politics,’	Review	of	African	Political	Economy	129	(2011):	367–386.	19	Beatrice	Hibou,	 ‘Domination	and	control	 in	Tunisia:	economic	 levers	for	the	exercise	of	authoritarian	power,’	
Review	of	African	Political	Economy	108	(2006):	185-206.	20	Hazbun,	 ‘Images	of	Openness,	 Spaces	of	Control:	The	Politics	of	Tourism	Development	 in	Tunisia,’	The	Arab	
Studies	Journal	(2007/2008):	10-35.	Karen	Pfeifer,	 ‘How	Tunisia,	Morocco,	Jordan,	and	even	Egypt	Became	IMF	Success	Stories	in	the	1990s,’	Middle	East	Report	29,	1	(1999):	23–27.	
Mediterranean	Region	such	as	Turkey	and	Egypt	(Table	1).	 In	addition,	over	 time	the	sector	has	 been	 the	 object	 of	 several	 legal	 initiatives	 (Table	 2)	 that	 favoured	 FDIs	 and	 established	new	governance	actors.21	
	
TABLE	1	AND	TABLE	2	HERE	(pages	21	and	following)	
	The	dark	side	of	this	interventionism	is	the	huge	environmental	and	social	costs	incurred,	as	international	 organisations	 repeatedly	 underlined.22	 This	 is	 exemplified	 in	 the	 uneven	development	of	Tunisian	regions,	whereby	the	coastal	areas	in	the	North	and	East	benefitted	from	 the	 promotion	 of	 tourism	 to	 the	 detriment	 of	 Western	 areas	 –	 a	 trend	 that	 is	 still	continuing,	 as	 emerges	 from	 Table	 3	 which	 summarises	 the	 investments	 in	 the	 regions	 of	Tunisia	between	2011	and	2012.		
TABLE	3	HERE	(pages	21	and	following)		Furthermore,	 the	 growth	 of	 the	 tourist	 sector	 led	 to	 an	 overestimation	 of	 its	 potential,	resulting	in	the	continuous	construction	of	new	accommodation	facilities	(see	Table	4)	and	in	a	situation	of	market	saturation.23	 In	 turn	this	has	 led	to	an	 increase	 in	 the	number	of	hotel	owners	borrowing	money	to	survive,	thus	generating	a	debt	crisis	in	the	sector.24	Along	with	the	absence	of	political	will	to	reform	the	sector,	this	explains	the	lack	of	resources	available	to	
																																								 																				21	Two	laws,	in	particular,	were	crucial	for	the	gradual	process	of	liberalisation	of	the	sector.	The	decree	66-339	(approved	2/2/1966)	and	the	 law	69-35	(6/6/1969)	were	aimed	to	encourage	the	building	of	new	hotels	and	had	a	relevant	role	in	attracting	private	investments.	22	 See,	 for	 example,	 World	 Bank,	 Country	 Assistance	 Strategy,	 28/3/2000,	 cit.	 but	 also	World	 Bank,	 Country	Assistance	Strategy	Report,	13/8/2007	(http://goo.gl/743x6R,	accessed	15/06/2014).		23	Wafa	Khlif,	‘L’hôtellerie	tunisienne:	radioscopie	d’un	secteur	en	crise,’	L’Année	du	Maghreb	1	(2006):	375-394.	24	Frida	Dahmani,	 ‘Pourquoi	 le	 tourisme	ne	 fait	 plus	 recette,’	 Jeune	Afrique,	 1/10/2010	 (http://goo.gl/zEMJjV,	accessed	 30/9/2014)	 but	 also	 Khaled	 Boumiza,	 Tourisme:	 Endetté	 et	 revendicatif,	 WebManagerCenter,	21/09/2003	(http://goo.gl/og0CSi,	accessed	31/08/2014).	
diversify	Tunisia’s	tourist	model.25			
TABLE	4	HERE	(pages	21	and	following)		Data	 suggest	 that	 the	 tourist	 sector	 in	 Tunisia	 has	 historically	 been	 regarded	 as	 a	 pillar	 of	development,	 with	 both	 the	 state	 and	 private	 actors	 investing	 in	 it.	 This	 led	 to	 the	establishment	 of	 a	 well-equipped	 industry	 difficult	 to	 be	 transformed	 significantly	 and	seemingly	 able	 to	 sustain	 the	 country	 even	 at	 turbulent	 times.	 Indeed,	 the	 overarching	hypothesis	of	 this	 article	 is	 that,	 despite	broader	 changes	 in	national	politics	with	Ben	Ali’s	fall,	 there	 is	 continuity	 in	 the	 model	 of	 tourism	 Tunisia	 presents.	 Such	 continuity	 is	problematic	today	because	of	the	relative	crisis	of	the	sector,	caused	by	political	turmoil	and	economic	 unsustainability.26	 The	 following	 section	 examines	 two	 thawabit	 in	 the	 tourist	industry,	 contrasting	 the	 periods	 before	 and	 after	 the	 uprisings:	 the	 persistence	 of	 the	touristic-developmental	model	and	 the	persistence	of	 tourism	as	 the	means	 to	promote	 the	image	of	a	‘new’	Tunisia	both	domestically	and	abroad.	Despite	contending	that	continuity	has	prevailed	over	change,	 the	analysis	also	highlights	that	some	change	 is	 taking	place.	 Indeed,	continuity	is	not	a	homogenous,	granitic	block	and	change	has	to	be	acknowledged	even	if	it	does	not	question	the	broader	touristic	model	the	Tunisian	governments	have	been	enforcing	for	decades,	despite	changes	in	the	international	tourism	market.		
	
	Thawabit	in	the	persistence	of	the	touristic	model	Tunisia	pioneered	the	industry	of	tourism	in	the	Arab	world.27	Since	independence,	the	tourist	
																																								 																				25	This	 is	evident	 in	 the	classification	of	beds	available	per	 type	of	 tourism.	For	example	 in	2010,	according	 to	ONTT,	 210,508	 beds	 were	 available	 for	 ‘seaside’	 tourism	 while	 15,172	 for	 ‘city’	 tourism.	 See:	 ONTT,	 Le	
tourisme	en	chiffres	(Tunis	:	ONTT,	2011).	26	 Ridha	 Lahmar,	 ‘La	 confusion	 tourisme-hôtellerie	 persiste!!’,	 Réalités,	 17/7/2013	 (http://goo.gl/2uUGkZ,	accessed	31/08/2014).	27	Interview	with	Lofti	Belaif,	tourist	guide,	Tunis,	26/04/2013.	
industry	was	considered	a	priority	and	the	Bourguiba	regime	established	new	institutions	to	strengthen	 and	 control	 the	 sector,28	 giving	 tourism	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 national	 development	plans.29	 Indeed,	 tourism	not	 only	 generated	 revenues	 by	 bringing	 foreign	 currency	 into	 the	country	 and	 stabilising	 macro-economic	 indicators,30	 but	 also	 realised	 Bourguiba’s	postcolonial	 vision	 of	 an	 ‘open	 country,’	 more	 attuned	 to	 Western	 values	 than	 other	 post-colonial	Arab	republics.	Tunisia’s	 touristic	model	was	built	upon	 the	so-called	 ‘3S’	 (Sea,	Sun	and	Sand),	whose	 typical	representation	 is	 the	Tanit,	a	seaside	accommodation	 intended	 for	European,	middle	class	mass	tourists.31	Between	1962	and	1972,32	 successive	development	plans	prioritised	 the	development	 of	the	sector.	Despite	indicating	the	state	as	responsible	for	its	take-off,33	the	tourist	sector	could	avoid	collectivization	and	benefitted	from	private	investments	due	to	its	strategic	role	in	the	economy.34	The	result	was	the	development	of	an	industry	characterised	by	mass	tourism	and	huge	 infrastructural	 investments	available	 for	building	accommodations;	a	model	 that	could	be	labelled	‘Fordist.’35	The	growth	of	the	sector	was	impressive.	Between	1962	and	1971,	the	number	of	beds	 increased	by	372.5	per	cent	and	 in	1970,	 the	sector	contributed	to	the	GDP	with	31.6	million	Tunisian	Dinar	(TD)	in	foreign	receipts,	thus	covering		48,7	per	cent	of	the	national	trade	deficit.36	
																																								 																				28	 Ammar	 Aloui,	 ‘Révolution	 et	 tourisme	 en	 Tunisie.	 Le	 secteur	 touristique	 en	 Tunisie	 avant	 et	 après	 le	‘Printemps	arabe’,	in	Di	Peri,	Raffaella	Giordana	(eds.),	Revolution	without	revolutions?	The	challenges	of	tourism	
sector	in	Tunisia	(Bologna:	I	Libri	di	Emil,	2013):	103-168.	Interview	with	Lotfi	Rahmouni,	Director	of	the	Institut	des	Hautes	Etudes	touristiques	de	Sidi	Dhrif,	Sidi	Dhrif,	26/04/2013;	interview	with	Chantal	Khadira,	Manager	of	the	Hotel	Majestic,	Tunis,	27/04/2013.	Interview	with	Yihad	Elloumi,	economic	consultant,	Tunis,	19/03/2014.	29	 See:	 Secrétariat	d’Etat	 au	Plan	et	 aux	 finances,	Perspectives	décennales	de	développement	1962-1971	 (Tunis	:	1961).	30	Jean	Mohammed	Chapoutot,	‘Tourisme,	Alternative	à	l’aménagement	en	Tunisie,’	Revue	d’économie	régionale	et	
Urbaine	4	(1990)	:	511-522.		31	Maxime	Weigert,	Le	tourisme	en	Tunisie.	Les	défis	à	l’heure	de	la	transition	démocratique,	Les	Notes	de	l’Ipemed,	12	(2012):	8.	32	The	3-year	development	plans	here	considered	are:	1962-1964,	1965-1968	and	1969-1972.	33	Aloui,	Le	tourisme	international	en	Tunisie:	Développement,	compétitivité,	dans	l’espace	méditerranéen.	Bilan	et	
stratégie	alternative	(Université	Aix-Marseille	III:	Centre	des	Hautes	études	du	Tourisme,	1986).	34	Commission	National	Sectorielle	du	Tourisme	et	du	Thermalisme	(CNSTT),	L’Evolution	du	Tourisme	en	Tunisie,	
Retrospective	(1961–1971)	(Tunis:	CNSTT,	1972).	35	Interview	to	a	former	manager	in	the	tourism	sector,	Tunis,	21/04/2013.	36	Robert	Poirier,	‘Tourism	and	Development	in	Tunisia,’	Annals	of	Tourism	Research	22,	1	(1995):	157-161.	
During	 this	 phase,	 few	 traders’	 families	 were	 leading	 the	 sector,	 such	 as	 the	 Fourati,	Khéchine,	 Allani	 and	 Miled	 from	 their	 home	 region	 of	 Kairouan	 (located	 inland	 from	 the	Sousse-Monastir	 tourism	 area).37	 These	 families	 often	 became	 involved	 in	 the	 industry	 by	managing	state-owned	hotels,	and	 later	developed	 the	 first	private	hotel	chains	of	Tunisia38	thanks	to	the	quasi-monopoly	on	the	industry	they	enjoyed.39	However,	private	ownership	did	not	change	 the	broader	model	Tunisian	 tourism	was	built	upon.	 In	 fact,	 the	 type	of	 tourism	the	country	appealed	to,	as	well	as	the	 infrastructures	available,	concurred	in	strengthening	the	existing	‘Fordist’	model.		Even	 the	 enforcement	 of	 aggressive	 privatisation	 plans,	 the	 so-called	 infitah,	 during	 the	1970s	did	not	question	 this	model.	The	 influx	of	Gulf	 and	European	capitals	 resulted	 in	 the	creation	of	business	partnerships	with	non-Tunisian	partners,	which	 integrated	 the	country	into	the	regional	economic	environment,	weakening	state	control.40	This	process	resulted	in	Tunisian	 tourism	becoming	dependent	on	 international	 tour-operators	and	 investors,	 to	 the	point	 that	 the	 latter	 began	 to	 buy	 stakes	 in	 hotels	 and	 created	 joint	 consortia,	 such	 as	 the	CTKD	(Consortium	Tuniso-Koweïtien	de	Développement),	or	specific	credit	programs	of	 the	African	 Bank	 for	 Development.41	 The	 presence	 of	 private	 and	 international	 capital	 in	 the	tourist	industry	however	did	not	stimulate	the	restructuring	of	the	sector,	as	it	continued	to	expand	by	relying	on	the	existing	modus	operandi.		
																																								 																				37	 Mohamed	 Bergaoui,	 Tourisme	 et	 voyages	 en	 Tunisie:	 Le	 temps	 des	 pionniers,	 1956–1973	 (Tunis:	 Mohamed	Bergaoui,	 2003).	 See	 also	 Abdelaziz	 Barrouhi,	 ‘La	 grande	 famille	 du	 tourisme’,	 Jeune	 Afrique,	 30/03/2009	(http://goo.gl/0KpLV3,	accessed	11/07/2014).	38	Interview	with	Ahmed	Smaoui,	former	Ministry	of	Tourism,	Tunis	18/03/2014.	39	 Interview	 with	 Lotfi	 Rahmouni,	 26/04/2013;	 Author’s	 discussion	 with	 tourist	 guides	 during	 the	 meeting	‘Journée	 des	 Associations	 du	 Patrimoine,	 du	 Tourisme	 &	 de	 l’Environnement’,	 Dar	 Bach	 Hamba,	 Tunis,	27/04/2013.	40	According	to	the	Ministry	of	Planning,	from	1962	to	1971,	public	investments	in	tourism	fell	from	88.9	per	cent	to	9	per	cent	while	private	investments	grew	from	11.1	per	cent	to	91	per	cent.	Rétrospectives	décennales	1962-
1971,	Publication	du	Ministère	du	Plan	(Tunis:	1972).	41	Interview	with	Abdellatif	Taboubi,	tourism	professionalt,	Tunis,	28/04/2013.	
The	 liberalisation	 of	 the	 tourist	 industry	 was	 encouraged	 by	 Ben	 Ali	 after	 his	 ascent	 to	power	 in	1987.42	 It	was	presented	as	a	means	 to	 insert	Tunisia	 in	 the	global	market	and	 to	attract	new	foreign	capitals	and	investments.	After	a	period	of	crisis	during	the	last	years	of	Bourguiba’s	mandate,	due	 to	political	 instability	and	severe	 financial	 stabilisation	plans,	 the	tourist	 industry	recovered	during	the	first	years	of	Ben	Ali’s	rule.	The	expansion	was	due	to	the	 inclusion	of	Tunisia	 in	 the	Structural	Adjustment	Plans	and	 the	 full	 convertibility	of	 the	TD.43	This	positive	development	was	also	facilitated	by	the	flourishing	of	private	investments	during	the	1990s.	Indeed,	the	1992	investment	code	allowed	new	entrepreneurial	actors,	the	so-called	promoteurs,	to	emerge	and	later,	between	1994	and	1996,	a	newer	investment	code	promoted	the	jeunes	promoteurs	and	further	facilitated	investment	procedures.44	This	growth	helped	Ben	Ali	to	promote	Tunisia	as	a	regional	tourist	destination.	As	one	interviewee	put	it,	‘during	the	1990s,	 it	seemed	that	tourism	was	the	only	preoccupation	of	the	Prime	Minister	and	 his	 entourage.’45	 Another	 interviewee	 highlighted	 that,	 between	 1986	 and	 1992,	 state	investment	 plans	 and	 the	 1992	 code	 facilitated	 the	 influx	 of	 private	 capitals	 by	 nearly	 300	million	 of	 dollars.46	 In	 the	 period	 corresponding	 to	 the	 Tenth	 Economic	 and	 Social	Development	Plan	(2000-2006)	the	growth	of	investments	in	the	tourist	industry	was	around	5	per	cent,	amounting	to,	according	to	the	ONTT,	1.9	billion	of	euros	(Table	5).			
TABLE	5	HERE	(pages	21	and	following)		
																																								 																				42	 See	 the	 VII	 (1987-1991)	 and	 VIII	 (1992-1996)	 plans	 of	 development.	Ministère	 du	 Plan,	 Le	 VIIeme	 Plan	 et	Ministère	du	Tourisme	et	de	l’Artisanat,	VIIIeme	Plan.	43	See	Robert	King,	‘The	political	logic	of	economic	reform	in	Tunisia,’	in	Azzedine	Layachi	(ed.),	Economic	crisis	
and	political	change	in	the	North	Africa	(Westport:	Praeger,	1998):	107-128.	44	Interview	with	Gueddiche	Romdhane,	tourism	consultant,	Tunis,	24/04/2013	and	18/03/2014.		45	Interview	with	GueddicheRomdhane,	24/04/2013.	46	Interview	with	Ahmed	Smaoui,	former	Ministry	of	Tourism,	Tunis	18/03/2014.	
The	seemingly	never-ending	growth	of	 investments	available	 for	 the	construction	of	new	facilities47	 (Table	 4),	 the	 huge	 profits	 for	 domestic	 and	 international	 investors	 and	 the	increase	in	jobs	generated	by	the	sector	led	to	the	crystallization	of	the	Tunisian	touristic	and	developmental	model.	Although	during	Ben	Ali’s	mandates	attempts	were	made	to	diversify	the	industry	by	investing	in	integrated	tourist	complexes	such	as	Port	el	Kantaoui,	or	in	areas	with	a	weaker	tourist	vocation,	as	the	Sahara	region,	the	touristic	model	has	remained	largely	unchanged.	The	model	however	presented	a	number	of	weaknesses	such	as	its	dependence	on	European	 tourism	 and	 investments,	 which	 have	 both	 suffered	 from	 the	 economic	 crisis	 in	recent	years.	In	addition,	recent	political	instability	in	North	Africa	also	discouraged	tourists	to	visit	Tunisia.48	Finally,	the	presence	of	private	interests	-	Ben	Ali’s	family	and	closest	circles’	interests	-	prevented	the	sector	from	changing.	An	evidence	of	this	is	the	absence	of	an	open	sky	 agreement.	 While	 it	 would	 have	 encouraged	 investments	 by	 low	 cost	 airlines,	 as	 in	Morocco	and	Turkey,	 it	could	have	damaged	the	monopoly	of	TunisAir,	known	to	be	part	of	the	business	assets	of	Ben	Ali’s	family.49	After	Ben	Ali's	 fall,	 the	model	has	not	undergone	significant	changes.	 Investments	remain	unbalanced	to	the	benefit	of	coastal	areas.50	The	ongoing	increase	in	the	number	of	beds	and	facilities	suggests	that	the	new	government	still	relies	on	a	model	characterised	by	perennial	hotel	 construction,	with	no	 consideration	 for	market	 saturation.	Pre-uprisings	development	plans	 are	 still	 running	 and,	 for	 instance,	 the	 XI	 development	 plan	 (2007-2011)	 foresees	investments	 in	 facilities	 for	2.3	billion	of	TD	(1.35	billion	of	Euros).	 Its	 final	goal	 is	 to	build	
																																								 																				47	As	reported	by	Abdellatif	Taboubi,	in	the	coastal	area	between	Nabeul	to	Mahdia	more	than	two	thirds	out	of	the	facilities	in	the	country	were	built	in	early	2000s	(Interview,	tourism	professional,	Tunis,	28/04/2013).	48	One	interviewee	reports	that	many	recently-built	facilities	were	left	almost	empty.	This	is	the	case	of	Port	el	Kantaoui	 (14,000	 beds	 available).	 Interview	 with	 Yiad	 Elloumi,	 tourism	 economic	 consultant,	 Tunis,	19/03/2014.	49	 ‘Tunisie:	 La	 Véritable	Nature	Du	 Régime	De	 Ben	Ali,’	Nawaat,	 13/1/2011	 (http://goo.gl/N4qK2G,	 accessed	30/9/2014)	and	also	Weigart,	Le	tourisme	en	Tunisie,	cit.	50	Author’s	interviews	realised	with	different	tourism	professionals	at	the	19	Salon	du	Tourisme	Tunisien	(MIT),	el	Kram,	24-27/4/2013.		
some	 25,000	 new	 beds,	 reaching	 by	 the	 end	 of	 2011	 a	 total	 of	 258,000	 beds	 available.51	Moreover,	the	ministers	of	tourism	in	charge	since	2011	(5	until	today),	although	aware	of	the	difficulties	of	 the	sector,52	seem	to	act	on	 the	basis	of	short-term	priorities,	with	 the	goal	of	‘saving	 the	 summer	 tourist	 season.’53	The	 initiatives	 they	promoted	 so	 far	 are	based	on	old	recipes.	For	example,	the	campaign	‘I	Love	Tunisia,’	launched	in	the	aftermath	of	the	uprisings	to	 save	 the	 tourist	 season	of	2011	and	developed	by	a	French	advertisement	 company,	has	been	 criticised	 because	 it	 proposed	 again	 a	 ‘mass	 tourism	 recipe,’	 based	 on	 a	 model	 of	development	 considered	 obsolete.54	 The	 Ministry	 of	 Tourism’s	 plan	 titled	 ‘La	 stratégie	 du	tourisme	 tunisien	 à	 l’horizon	 2016’	 does	 not	 only	 lack	 an	 overall	 and	 comprehensive	strategy,55	but	was	issued	in	2009,	before	the	revolution.	The	government	has	not	updated	this	document	 yet,	 and	 it	 constitutes	 the	 only	 institutional	 strategy	 elaborated	 in	 the	 realm	 of	tourism.	As	pointed	out	by	 the	 former	director	of	 the	ONTT	Habib	Ammar,	 this	plan	has	 at	least	two	weaknesses:	 it	pays	no	attention	to	the	territory	and	lacks	a	strategy	that	 looks	at	Tunisian	tourism	as	part	of	the	broader	regional	context.56	Political	parties	also	seem	to	lack	long-term	perspective.	For	example,	Al-Nahda	considers	tourism	an	important	factor	for	the	national	economy	but	does	not	propose	any	strategy	to	improve	or	change	the	current	model.	It	 broadly	 points	 to	 the	 necessity	 to	 elaborate	 a	 shared	 tourism	national	 policy	 in	 order	 to	
																																								 																				51	 ‘Tourisme	 intégré,	 mode	 d’emploi,’	 Jeune	 Afrique,	 30/09/2007	 (http://goo.gl/h0HW3x,	 accessed	13/08/2014).	52	 See,	 for	 example,	 the	declaration	of	 ex-Minister	Elyes	Fakhfakh	who	 repeatedly	 stressed	 the	need	 to	 revive	Tunisian	tourism,	whose	weaknesses	date	back	to	the	period	before	the	revolution.	Oualid	Dachraoui,	‘Interview	de	Mr	Elyès	Fakhfakh,	nouveau	ministre	tunisien	du	tourisme,’	00216Mag,	29/12/20011(http://goo.gl/MmFidv	accessed	11/07/2014).	53	 See	:	 Amel	 Karboul	 first	 speech	 as	 Minister	 of	 Tourism,	 Youtube,	 30/1/2014	 (http://goo.gl/YW3QFmti,	accessed	3/8/2014).	54	Ali	Gargouri,	 ‘Où	sont	passés	 les	fonds	investis	pour	promouvoir	 le	tourisme	tunisien	?,’	Nawaat,	8/10/2011	(http://goo.gl/dNmDoy,	accessed	12/07/2014).	55	 The	 plan	 establishes	 the	 following	 principles:	 diversification	 of	 tourism;	 creation	 of	 a	 new	 communication	system	useful	 to	advertise	 tourism;	a	marketing	plan;	 financing	 the	sector	 through	an	ad	hoc	 investment	plan.	The	 aim	 is	make	 of	 Tunisia	 one	 of	 the	main	 tourist	 destinations	 in	 the	world.	 See	 also	 the	 document	 on	 the	strategic	vision	of	Tunisian	tourism	at	http://goo.gl/J6Hjmz	(accessed	10/07/2014).	56	‘Interview	to	Habib	Ammar,’	WebManagerCenter,	14/4/2011	(http://goo.gl/lnQfTH,	accessed	11/07/2014).	
overcome	the	crisis.57	It	must	be	emphasised,	however,	that	Minister	Amel	Karboul,	appointed	in	 January	 2014,	 is	 attempting	 to	 stimulate	 the	 public	 discourse	 on	 tourism,	 debating	 the	extant	 model	 and	 presenting	 tourism	 as	 ‘everyone's	 business.’58	 Despite	 this,	 many	 believe	that	she	will	not	deliver	what	she	promised.59	Beyond	the	rhetoric	of	‘new-ism,’	the	first	issue	to	remain	unsolved	is	the	diversification	of	touristic	products	Tunisia	could	offer.	Despite	the	construction	of	the	new	integrated	touristic	complexes	of	Port	el	Kantaoui	and	Yasmine	Hammamet,60	which	partially	 conveyed	a	novel	image	of	the	country,	the	most	common	touristic	formula	for	Tunisia	remains	the	all-inclusive	package,	with	international	tour	operators	promoting	it	almost	uniquely.61	In	addition,	except	for	the	promotion	of	Saharan	tourism,	the	bulk	of	investments	focused	on	the	coast.62	This	not	only	 has	 had	 negative	 consequences	 on	 the	 environment,	 which	 had	 already	 been	 heavily	exploited,	 but	 also	 created	 a	 gap	 between	 the	 official	 discourse	 and	what	 happened	 on	 the	ground.63		
	
Second	thawabit:	tourism	as	a	part	of	the	narrative	of	the	‘new	Tunisia’	The	 second	 constant	 is	 the	 continuity	 in	 the	 representation	 of	 tourism	 as	 a	 successful	economic	sector,	pivotal	to	the	narrative	of	the	‘new	Tunisia’.	In	this	regard,	the	year	1987	is	a	key	date	for	both	Tunisian	politics	and	tourism.	Indeed,	under	Ben	Ali’s	rule,	tourism	became	the	showcase	of	the	new,	post-1987	Tunisia.	He	pledged	to	create	a	new	era	based	on	political	
																																								 																				57	 Interview	 with	 Mohammed	 Khouja,	 Tunis,	 17/04/2014.	 For	 Al-Nahda’s	 electoral	 programme	 see	http://goo.gl/NvL6J6	(accessed	21/05/2014).	58	 See	 Kamel	 Bouaouina,	 ‘Le	 tourisme,	 c'est	 l'affaire	 de	 tous	 !,’	 Le	 Temps,	 12/6/2014	 (http://goo.gl/mG8ddF	accessed	 30/9/2014)	;	 ‘Consultation	 nationale	 sur	 le	 Tourisme,’	 WebManagerCenter,	 05/04/2004,	http://goo.gl/GB70if,	accessed	12/07/2014).	59	 Bouaouina,	 ‘Notre	 ministère	 semble	 avoir…,’	 Le	 Temps,	 12/6/2014	 (http://goo.gl/T1FwZo,	 accessed	20/07/2014).	60	Interview	with	Yihad	Elloumi,	economic	consultant,	Tunis,	19/03/2014.	On	Hammamet	see:	Mohamed	Hellal,	‘La	 marina	 de	 la	 station	 touristique	 intégrée	 Yasmine-Hammamet	 (Tunisie).	 Enjeux,	 conception	 et	 impacts,’	
L'Information	géographique	4,	73	(2009):	6-23.	61	Interview	with	Ahmed	Trabelsi,	President	de	l’Association	Patrimoine	&	Environnement,	Tunis,	14/03/2014.	62	Interview	with	Yihad	Elloumi,	tourism	economic	consultant,	Tunis,	19/03/2014.	63	 Abelala	 Bounouh,	 ‘Nouvelles	 approches	 en	 matière	 de	 protection	 et	 de	 gestion	 du	 littorale	 en	 Tunisie,’	
Méditerranée	115	(2010):	45-53.		
pluralism,	 ending	 of	 corruption	 and	 economic	 growth	 through	 integration	 into	 the	 global	economy.	 Tourism	 was	 a	 crucial	 element	 of	 his	 strategy	 and	 power	 consolidation.	 It	 is	 no	coincidence	that	during	the	first	council	of	ministers,	which	took	place	5	days	after	the	coup,	the	necessity	of	launching	a	new	strategy	for	tourism,	was	discussed.64	Furthermore,	in	1988	Ben	 Ali	 created	 the	 Ministry	 of	 tourism	 choosing	 personally	 the	 first	 minister,	 Mohamed	Jegham,	 Ben	 Ali’s	 friend	 and	 expert	 in	 the	 development	 of	 big	 touristic	 complexes.65	 Since	then,	positions	 in	 the	 institutions	governing	 the	 sector,	whose	number	 increased	 leading	 to	growing	bureaucratisation,	were	highly	contested	because	of	the	power	coming	with	them.66	As	an	interviewee	said,	‘Tunisians	knew	that	accessing	the	tourism	bureaucracy	under	Ben	Ali	was	a	way	to	control	the	main	levers	of	the	economy.’67	Ben	Ali’s	attempt	at	making	tourism	crucial	to	his	narrative	of	a	new	Tunisia	was	helped	by	the	 fact	 that	 the	 sector	 emerged	 from	 a	 phase	 of	 crisis68	 in	 timely	 coincidence	 with	 the	beginning	of	his	mandate.	When	Ben	Ali	ascended	to	power,	a	number	of	contingent	 factors	allowed	the	sector	to	grow	again.	In	1988,	a	significant	recovery	took	place	with	the	number	of	tourists’	arrivals	increasing	to	3,468,360,	compared	to	1,874,734	in	1987.	Investments	in	the	sector	also	increased.	However,	as	Hazbun	points	out,	this	growth	was	not	determined	by	Ben	Ali’s	ability	rather	by	external	factors	such	as	the	economic	recovery	in	Northern	Europe	that	made	Tunisian	prices	competitive,	especially	after	the	1986	TD	devaluation.69	In	addition,	the	
																																								 																				64	ONTT,	Le	VIIème	Plan	cit.,	14.	65	Interview	with	Gueddiche	Romdhane,	tourism’s	consultant,	Tunis,	24/04/2013.	66	See,	for	example,	the	case	of	Tijani	Haddad,	Minister	of	Tourism	in	2004,	nicknamed	‘Mister	Tourism’	for	the	numerous	 positions	 (and	 power)	 he	 obtained	 over	 the	 years.	 See:	 Abdelaziz	 Barrouhi,	 ‘Monsieur	 Tourisme,’	
Jeune	Afrique,	12/12/2005	(http://goo.gl/OhvqNI,	accessed	31/08/2014).		67	Interview,	Tunis,	19/04/2013,	anonymous	source.		68	 The	 crisis	 was	 caused	 by	 financial	 and	 political	 issues:	 the	 gradual	 worsening	 of	 the	 national	 balance	 of	payments;	decrease	in	the	total	amount	of	investment	in	tourism	(from	64,210	TD	1981	to	3,954	in	1986);	the	displacement	of	the	PLO	in	Tunis,	followed	by	the	1985	Israeli	bombing;	and	the	escalation	of	violence	between	the	government	and	Islamist	forces,	which	led	to	bombings	in	Sousse	and	Monastir	few	months	before	the	1987	coup.	These	factors	concur	to	explain	the	pre-1987	crisis	of	the	industry.	According	to	the	ONTT	tourists	arrivals	dropped	from	2,002,997	in	1985	to	1,502,092	in	1986	(-24.9	per	cent).	See	Jean-Marie	Miossec,	Le	tourisme	en	
Tunisie	un	pays	en	développement	dans	l’espace	touristique	international	(Thèse	de	doctorat,	Université	de	Tours	1,	1996):	560.	69	Hazbun,	Images	of	Openness,	Spaces	of	Control,	cit.,	14-15.	
confidence	 of	 the	 market	 and	 international	 organisations70	 in	 the	 ability	 of	 Tunisia	 to	overcome	the	crisis	helped	Ben	Ali	in	consolidating	his	image	and	reputation	as	the	initiator	of	a	successful,	new	era	for	Tunisia.	In	particular,	the	1988	successful	summer	season	helped	him	to	 consolidate	 tourism	 as	 a	 tool	 of	 control	 over	 the	 territory	 and	 the	 population,	 while	presenting	 Tunisia	 as	 an	 open	 and	 modern	 country	 abroad.71	 One	 of	 the	 key	 strategies	deployed	by	Ben	Ali	was	diversification,	which	was	substantiated	in	the	construction	of	new	resorts,	 the	permission	 to	 film	 industry	 to	use	 locations	on	 the	 territory	and	 the	attempt	 to	expand	Saharan	tourism.	Such	projects	were	mediatised	thanks	to	spectacular	inauguration’s	ceremonies	and	the	creation	of	new	brands	and	new	product	for	tourists.72	In	the	short-term	this	 strategy	 was	 successful,	 as	 investments	 in	 the	 sector	 increased	 (Table	 5)	 along	 with	tourist’s	arrivals	which,	according	to	the	ONTT,	doubled	between	1988	(3,468,360)	and	2010	(6,902,749).	However,	this	success	story	did	not	solve	those	issues	that	have	gradually	led	to	the	saturation	of	the	Tunisian	tourist	market	and	its	crisis.		The	second	unresolved	issue	is	linked	to	the	belief	that	tourism	would	have	been	a	driving	force	for	the	Tunisian	economy	as	a	whole.	This	did	not	happen.	However,	Ben	Ali	successfully	reiterated	this	belief	by,	for	instance,	presenting	the	growth	of	jobs	in	the	tourist	sector	as	an	example	 of	 the	 good	 performance	 of	 the	 labour	market	 tout	 court.73	 As	 a	 consequence,	 the	seemingly	never-ending	growth	of	tourism	allowed	the	regime	to	shift	the	attention	from	the	bad	performance	of	other	macro-economic	indicators,	hiding	the	economic	difficulties	Tunisia	
																																								 																				70	 The	 signature	 of	 a	 Stand-by	 Agreement	 which	 enacted	 a	 series	 of	 structural	 adjustment	 and	 stabilisation	programs	under	 the	guidance	of	 the	 IMF	and	WB,	played	an	 important	 role	 in	 this.	 See:	Mohamed	Bechri	 and	Sonia	 Naccache,	 ‘The	 Political	 Economy	 of	 Development	 Policy	 in	 Tunisia,’	 in	 Jeffrey	 Nugent	 amd	 Hashem	Pesaran	 (eds.),	 Explaining	 Growth	 in	 the	 Middle	 East.	 Contributions	 to	 Economic	 Analysis,	 Vol.	 278	 (Bradford:	Emerald):	308-334.	71	Hazbun	‘Globalisation,	Reterritorialisation	and	the	Political	Economy	of	Tourism’,	cit.	72	 See,	 for	 example:	 ‘Tijani	 Haddad,	ministre	 du	 Tourisme:	 “Nous	 avons	 plusieurs	 cordes	 à	 notre	 arc!”,’	 Jeune	
Afrique,	10/07/2005	(http://goo.gl/M4hT74,	accessed	14/08/2014).	73	According	to	the	World	Bank	in	2005	the	unemployment	rate	among	young	people	(15-24	years)	was	about	the	15	per	cent	and	reaches	the	30per	cent	in	2009.	World	Bank	Reports	2006-2010	(http://goo.gl/CSWx3f).		
was	facing.	Despite	evidence	of	the	crisis,	such	as	the	heavy	indebtedness	of	hotel	owners,74	the	prevailing	touristic	model	remained	largely	untouched.		In	 early	 2000s,	 despite	 the	 crisis	 of	 tourism	 as	 evidenced	 by	 the	 decline	 of	 the	 sector’s	contribution	to	the	national	GDP	(Table	1),	Ben	Ali	successfully	presented	the	crisis	as	a	short-term	phenomenon.	He	did	this	by	downplaying	the	lack	of	a	national	development	strategy	for	tourism	and	by	blaming	external	events,	namely	the	outbreak	of	the	second	Intifada	in	2000,	9/11,	 the	2003	war	 in	 Iraq,	 and	 the	bombings	 in	Djerba	and	Casablanca	 in	2002	and	2003.	Although	 these	 events	 did	 actually	 contribute	 to	 the	 decline	 in	 the	 tourists’	 arrivals	 in	 the	region,75	it	should	be	emphasised	that	the	roots	of	the	relative	crisis	of	Tunisian	tourism	were	also	 linked	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 long-term	 strategy.	 As	 pointed	 out	 by	 an	 interviewee,	 a	 former	executive	of	the	ONTT,	during	the	2000s,	the	doubling	of	hotel	capacity	was	not	accompanied	by	broader	measures,	such	as	effective	promotion	and	training.	According	to	him,	the	political	will	to	address	the	weaknesses	of	the	sector	was	absent,	and	even	some	World	Bank	studies	urging	the	government	to	diversify	the	industry,	have	never	been	made	public.76	After	the	fall	of	Ben	Ali,	the	crisis	seems	to	have	burst	out	in	the	open	and	it	is	discussed	in	articles	 published	 in	 the	 national	 and	 international	 press.77	 However,	 although	 the	 issue	entered	the	public	debate,	continuity	seems	to	prevail.	The	new	government	in	power	indeed	has	not	proceeded	to	diversifying	the	type	of	touristic	products	Tunisia	offers,	and	the	same	narrative	about	tourism	and	‘new-ism’	is	still	present.	In	post-Ben	Ali	Tunisia,	indeed,	tourism	is	an	instrument	to	promote	the	political	transition,	which	ideally	should	navigate	the	country	into	 a	 new	 era	 of	 prosperity	 and	 democracy.	 This	 narrative	 is	 also	 strengthened	 by	 the	
																																								 																				74	On	this,	see	the	dossier	of	the	magazine	l’Expression,	‘Gros	nuages	sur	le	tourisme	tunisien’,	39,	July	2008	and	Khaled	Boumiza,	‘Tourisme:	Endetté	et	revendicatif,’	cit.	75	 See,	 for	 example,	 ‘Journée	 du	 tourisme:	 Conforter	 la	 place	 de	 la	 Tunisie	 sur	 les	 marchés	 mondiaux,’	
WebManagerCenter,	01/01/2004	(http://goo.gl/sBT4BS,	accessed	3/08/2014).	76	Interview,	Tunis,	20/02/2014,	anonymous	source.	77	Bouaouina,	 ‘L’ONTT	 frappe	 fort:	 8	hôtels	déclassés	 et	19	agences	de	voyages	 fermées,’	Le	Temps,	 9/7/2014	(http://goo.gl/rUY7R1,	accessed	2/08/2014).	
relative	 success	 of	 Tunisia’s	 tourist	 industry	 if	 compared	 to	 the	 other	 countries	 that	 went	through	turmoil,	such	as	Egypt	–	a	difference	that	Tunisian	authorities	emphasise.78		The	narrative	of	 a	new	Tunisia	 is	 substantiated	 in	 the	attempt	 to	 represent	 tourism	as	a	‘clean	 sector,’	 free	 from	 those	dynamics	 of	 patronage	prevalent	 in	 the	pre-2011	period.79	A	strategy	to	make	this	come	true	is	replacing	officers	in	key-positions.	Examples	of	this	are	the	nomination	 of	 Amel	 Karbel	 as	Minister	 of	 Tourism,	 the	 first	 woman	 to	 hold	 this	 post,	 and	Mohammed	Ali	Toumi	as	the	new	Director	of	FTAV,	the	Fédération	Tunisienne	des	Agences	de	Voyage	 et	 de	Tourisme.	Toumi	 emphasised	 the	use	of	 new	 technologies,	 the	deployment	of	new	marketing	strategies	and	innovative	training	methods	to	enhance	the	performance	of	the	sector,	thus	engendering	a	feeling	of	novelty.	In	his	words,	 ‘the	federation	has	experienced	a	real	 “revolution”	 with	 the	 goal	 to	 make	 it	 more	 competitive	 on	 the	 market	 and	 more	responsive	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 sector.’80	 Another	 attempt	 to	 foster	 this	 new-ist	 narrative	 is	constituted	by	efforts	of	diversification.	They	have	indeed	been	presented	by	authorities	and,	additionally,	take	place	in	the	framework	of	the	decentralisation	policy,	a	novelty	included	in	the	 new	 constitution	 itself.	 Nevertheless,	 they	 have	 many	 similarities	 with	 the	 efforts	 for	tourism	 diversification	 undertaken	 during	 Ben	 Ali’s	 era,81	 as	 for	 instance	 is	 the	 case	 of	Saharan82	and	rural	tourism.83		In	order	to	sustain	the	‘new-ist’	rhetoric	of	a	new	Tunisia	and	tourist	industry,	post-2011	authorities	 have	 had	 the	 tendency	 to	 present	 the	 difficulties	 of	 the	 sector	 as	 a	 short-term	
																																								 																				78	 See,	 ‘Tourisme:	 La	 Tunisie	 se	 redresse	 plus	 vite	 que	 l’Egypte,’	 Milles	 et	 une	 Tunisie,	 03/12/2012	(http://goo.gl/mnzF7c,	accessed	31/08/2014).	79	 ‘OT	 de	 Tunisie:	 notre	 modèle	 touristique	 n’est	 pas	 le	 fruit	 d’un	 régime	 politique,’	 l’Echo	 Touristique,	19/01/2011	(http://goo.gl/5bov3M,	accessed	31/08/2014).	80	Interview	with	Mohamed	Ali	Toumi,	Tunis,	29/04/2013.	81	Sami	Yassine	Turki,	‘Evolution	of	Cities	and	Territories	in	Tunisia	through	Parties’	Electoral	Programmes	and	Civil	Society’s	Proposal,’	Built	Environment	40,	1	(2014):	85-100.		82	On	the	new	Saharian	Plan	of	Development	see	:	‘Tunisie:	annonce	d'un	plan	de	relance	du	tourisme	saharien,’	
Maghreb	 Emergent,	 21/02/2014	 (http://goo.gl/DQtUnh,	 accessed	 30/9/2014)	 and	 Hamza	 Marzouk,	 ‘Le	tourisme	 saharien,	 maillon	 faible	 du	 tourisme	 tunisien,’	 L’Economiste	 Maghrebin,	 20/12/2013	(http://goo.gl/Q5qcDA,	accessed	31/08/2014).	83	On	rural	tourism,	see:	‘La	ministre	du	Tourisme	bientôt	en	visite	au	Kef	et	à	Jendouba,’	Réalités,	19/03/2014	(http://goo.gl/0vnNh8/,	accessed	30/9/2014).	See	also	Selima	Karoui,	‘Réaménagement	du	secteur	de	l’art	dans	les	 régions	 intérieures	 par	 l’investissement	 de	 la	 société	 civile,’	 Nawaat,	 9/1/2014	 (http://goo.gl/r864q8,	accessed	31/08/2014).	
phenomenon	 instead	 of	 a	 structural	 problem,	 as	 it	 happened	 in	 pre-2011	 Tunisia,	 thus	absolving	themselves	from	accusations	of	mismanagement.	For	instance,	the	responsibility	for	the	 relative	 crisis	 the	 sector	 is	 going	 through	 is	 blamed	 on	 the	 Islamists.	 They	 are	 charged	with	considering	tourism	a	form	of	‘prostitution,’	as	Marzouki	declared.84	This	accusation	was	also	 helped	 by	 violent	 confrontations	 between	 Salafists	 and	 the	 Tunisian	 army85	 and	 by	campaigns	discouraging	tourists	to	visit	areas	considered	to	be	in	the	hands	of	Salafists.86	In	a	similar	vein,	the	2013	visit	of	the	Egyptian	preacher	Mohamed	Hassen	to	the	touristic	district	of	Hamammet	was	considered	by	professionals	of	the	sector	as	damaging	the	image	of	Tunisia	as	a	safe	touristic	destination.87	Despite	 the	 ‘thawabit’	 in	presenting	 tourism	as	a	part	of	 the	narrative	of	a	 ‘new	Tunisia,’	some	 elements	 of	 rupture	 exist.	 For	 example,	 a	 relevant	 effect	 of	 the	 revolution	 is	 that	government’s	 performances	 are	 questioned	 publicly.	 In	 an	 article	 published	 in	 the	 online	journal	 ‘Le	tourisme	Magazine’	in	2013,	it	 is	stated	that	data	and	figures	provided	the	ONTT	about	tourism-related	policies	have	been	manipulated	in	order	to	show	that	the	government’s	diversification	strategy	is	successful.88	On	the	contrary,	according	to	the	article,	 investments	in	 less	 touristy	 areas	 are	 not	 paying	 off	 considering	 that,	 for	 example,	 the	 region	 of	 Gafsa-Tozeur	lost	70	per	cent	of	its	tourists	(310,919	versus	998,287	in	2010)	and	the	Tabarka-Ain	Draham	region	registered	a	decline	of	40	per	cent	in	tourists’	arrivals.	Another	example	is	the	growing	citizens’	request	to	participate	in	the	decision-making	of	public	policies	that	impact	on	 the	 population	 and	 the	 territory,	 a	 request	 that	 is	 openly	 debated.	 The	 opening	 up	 of	decision-making	processes	could	generate,	in	the	medium	or	long	period,	virtuous	effects	that	
																																								 																				84	Marzouki	Declaration,	12/7/2012.	See:	http://goo.gl/OVR5Dp	(accessed	31/08/2014).	85	 ‘Tunisian	 police	 arrest	 10	 Islamists	 following	 violent	 clashes	 in	 Kef,’	 Albawaba	 News,	 1/12/2013	(http://goo.gl/SV5BTj,	accessed	20/08/2014).					86	 Monia	 Ghamni,	 ‘Salafist	 resurgence	 jeopardises	 Tunisian	 tourism,’	 Magharebia,	 26/04/2013	(http://goo.gl/f4ldcU,	accessed	31/08/2014).		87	 See,	 for	 example,	Wafa	 Latik,	 ‘Tunisie:	 L'arrivée	 du	prédicateur	 égyptien	Mohamed	Hassan	menace-t-elle	 le	tourisme	à	Hammamat	?,’	LeMag,	2/5/2013	(http://goo.gl/Sr1vCF,	accessed	15/08/2014).	88	See	:	 ‘Le	vrai	bilan	du	tourisme	tunisien,’	Le	tourisme	Magazine,	02/11/2013	(http://goo.gl/5BjQi7,	accessed	31/08/2014).	
could	not	only	stop	the	crisis	when	it	comes	to	tourism,	but	also	accelerate	Tunisia’s	political	transition.	In	addition,	citizens	increasingly	use	their	visibility	to	promote	sustainable	tourism.	This	is	the	case	for	the	Association	for	the	safeguard	of	the	Medina	of	Kef,	an	area	that	has	not	traditionally	benefitted	from	tourism,	which	promotes	sustainable	tourism	with	the	goals	of	re-appropriating	 the	 cultural	 heritage	 of	 the	 region	 and	 stimulating	 local	 development.	However,	the	activities	of	the	association	lack	a	comprehensive	and	integrated	strategy	aimed	to	reach	out	to	public	institutions.89	This	problem	relates	to	the	troubled	relationship	between	the	 national	 authorities	 and	 local	 communities,	 a	 legacy	 of	 state	 centralisation	 during	 the	authoritarian	 period.	 Another	 attempt	 at	 influencing	 the	 decision-making	 process	 at	 the	micro-level	 is	 the	 ‘Cafè	 du	 Patrimoine,’	 where	 professionals	 discuss	 the	 creation	 of	 new	training	 programs	 for	 tourist	 guides,	 working	 conditions	 as	 well	 as	 challenges	 to	 the	protection	 of	 the	 national	 cultural	 heritage.90	 Discussions	 about	 the	 preservation	 of	 the	cultural	 heritage	 seem	 to	 be	 promising	 as	 they	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 the	 beginning	 of	 broader	reflections	 about	 models	 of	 sustainable	 tourism,	 strictly	 connected	 to	 social	 and	 economic	development.91	Notwithstanding	these	promising	initiatives,	the	reform	of	the	tourist	sector	is	still	one	of	the	biggest	challenges	of	the	new	Tunisia.92		
Conclusion	Tourism	 is	 a	 crucial	 sector	 in	 the	 Tunisian	 economy	 and	 it	 has	 a	 considerable	 role	 in	determining	economic	and	political	choices.	While	it	is	true	that,	over	the	years,	tourism	has	been	a	significant	income	generator,	it	is	also	necessary	to	consider	that	such	revenues	were	generated	 by	 an	 aggressive	 exploitation	 of	 the	 ‘Tunisian	 model’	 and	 consequently	 of	 the	
																																								 																				89	Author’s	participation	 to	 the	 seminar	 for	 the	preservation	of	 the	 cultural	heritage	and	author’s	 focus	group	with	the	members	of	the	Association	pour	le	sauvegarde	de	la	Medina	du	Kef,	Le	Kef,	15/03/2014.	90	Author’s	participation	in	the	first	meeting	of	‘Cafè	du	patrimoine’,	Dar	Bach	Hamba,	Tunis,	27/04/2013.	Report	of	the	conference	‘Le	droit	au	patrimoine’	held	by	Mr.	Zoubeir	Mouhli,	Directeur	de	l’ASM	Tunis,	27/07/2013.		91	Interview	with	Ahmed	Trabelsi,	14/03/2014.	92	 Ridha	 Lahmar,	 ‘La	 réforme	 du	 tourisme	 toujours	 en	 panne!,’	 Réalités,	 23/’6/2014	 (http://goo.gl/L3d1yw,	accessed	31/08/2014).	
territory,	regardless	of	the	consequences	of	this	exploitation.	Despite	the	tentative	promotion	of	 new	 forms	 of	 tourism,	 continuity	 has	 prevailed	 over	 the	 years	 in	 the	 maintenance	 of	 a	deficient	touristic	model	and	in	the	role	assigned	to	tourism	as	the	pivot	of	an	ongoing,	more	rhetorical	than	actual,	process	of	change.	Thus,	the	thawabit	of	Tunisian	tourism	seem	to	be	very	 resistant	 even	 if,	 after	 the	 revolution,	 they	have	become	more	porous	 than	 in	 the	past	thanks	to	a	genuine	debate	about	the	future	of	the	sector.	Nevertheless,	before	and	after	the	revolution	 likewise,	 the	 tourist	 sector	 seems	 to	 be	 led	 by	 logic	 of	 exploitation	 and	securitisation.	Only	the	claim	for	a	more	open	and	democratic	decision-making	process	might	provide	a	chance	to	reverse	this	problematic	trend.		
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Table	1		 Travel	and	tourism	total	contribution	to	GDP	1990-2013	(%)	
	 1990		 1995	 2000	 2005	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	
Algeria		 4.5		 4.5	 6.2	 8.2	 8.4	 8.1	 8.2	 8	
Egypt		 9.6	 11.5	 14	 19	 17.5	 14.5	 14.8	 12.6	
Israel		 8.4	 8.7	 9.8	 7.8	 7.5	 7.4	 7.5	 7.3	
Jordan		 25.3			 22.9	 20.7	 21.8	 23.7	 20.3	 21.4	 20.3	
Lebanon		 5.9		 4	 1.1	 29	 27.9	 22.5	 19.9	 19.2	
Libya		 3.3	 3.7	 5.2	 7.2	 4.4	 5.5	 6.7	 6.2	
Morocco		 9.1	 10	 12.1	 18.5	 19.3	 19.2	 19.2	 18.7	
Syria			 7.5	 15.5	 13.9	 14.4	 19.6	 18.2	 12.9	 10.6	
Tunisia		 12.8	 16.1	 19.7	 19.4	 17.5	 14.7	 15.6	 15.1	
Turkey		 6.8	 8.2	 10.6	 12.2	 10.2	 11.6	 11.9	 12,3	
Source:	Our	elaboration	on	World	Travel	and	Tourism	Council	(WTTC)		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	Table	2		 Juridification	of	touristic	sector	in	Tunisia	1956-2012	
	
Type	 Bourguiba	(1956-
1987)	
Ben	Ali	(1987-	
2011)	
Post	Ben	Ali	until	
2012	Laws	 18	 46	 01	Law	decrees	 05	 00	 00	Governmental	Decrees	 36	 98	 09	Local	 decrees	(ordinances)	 23	 79	 06	Notifications	 00	 03	 00	Total		 84	 226	 16	
	
Source	:	 Our	 elaboration	 on	 CNUDST	 (www.cnudst.rnrt.tn/)	 and	 Journal	 Officiel	 de	 la	 République	
Tunisienne	(JORT)		(www.iort.gov.tn/).		
	
	
Table	3		 Investments	per	Regions	in	Tunisia	2011/2012		
Period	 8	months	2011	 8	months	2012	 Evol.		%	
Amount	 %	 Amount	 %	 Total	
Evol.	
East	 1444,3	MDT	 67,6	 2107,4	MDT	 79,8	 45,9	
West	 692,5	MDT	 32,4	 534,3	MDT	 20,2	 -22,8	
Total	 2136,8	MDT	 100	 2641,7	MDT	 100	 23,6	
Source	:	Our	elaboration	on	Agence	de	Promotion	de	l’Industrie	et	de	l’Innovation	(Tunis)		
	
	
Table	4	 	 Evolution	of	the	accommodation	capacity	(1965-2011)	
	
Years	 Number	of	structures	 Bed	capacity	 Average	bed	capacity	
for	structure		 Number	 AAGR%	 Number	 AAGR%	 Number	 AAGR%	
1965	 85	 -	 8726	 -	 102.6	 -	
1971	 226	 165.9	 41252	 372.5	 182.5	 78.0	
1981	 336	 48.7	 75847	 83.9	 225.7	 23.7	
1991	 532	 58.3	 123188	 62.4	 231.6	 2.6	
2001	 755	 41.9	 205605	 66.9	 272.3	 17.6	
2008	 837	 10.9	 238495	 16.0	 285.0	 4.6	
2009	 856	 02.3	 239890	 0.05	 280.2	 -0.01	
2010	 856	 0.0	 241528	 0.06	 282.1	 0.06	
2011	 861	 0,58	 242146	 0,25	 281,2	 -0,31	
Source	:	ONTT-	Office	National	du	Tourism	Tunisien.	If	not	otherwise	specified,	all	ONTT	data	are	taken	from	Le	
tourisme	Tunisien	en	chiffres	(Tunis:	ONTT),	a	report	the	ONTT	releases	every	year.	AAGR:	Annual	average	rate	of	growth	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
		
Table	5	Investments	in	tourist	industry	(millions	of	Tunisian	Dinars)		 Tourist	
investments	
Tunisian	
investments	
FDIs	
1994	 397.8	 380.8	 17	
1995	 449.1	 421	 28.1	
1996	 416.95	 368.55	 48.4	
1997	 353.3	 330.3	 23	
1998	 307	 282.4	 24.6	
1999	 324.68	 287.48	 37.2	
2000	 322.45	 280.95	 41.5	
2001	 330.86	 229.76	 101.1	
2002	 353.3	 333.3	 20	
2003	 282.3	 263.8	 18.5	
2004	 288.18	 267.18	 21	
2005	 246.21	 229.44	 16.8	
2006	 204.55	 186.55	 18	
2007	 213.18	 141.18	 72	
2008	 253.61	 55.01	 198.6	
2009	 309.27	 223.77	 85.5	
TOTAL	 5052.74	 4281.47	 771.27	
	
Source:	ONTT,	Le	tourisme	en	chiffres,	2010		
		
